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ABSTRACT 
Delay in Contests  
by Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad* 
Why is there delay in contests? In this paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning 
of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may 
occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in 
relative strengths is moderate, and if the additional cost of investment in future strength 
is low. 
 
Keywords: Delay, contest, conflict 
JEL classification: B31, D74, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verzögerung in Konfliktsituationen  
In Konfliktsituationen findet der ’showdown’ häufig mit einer Verzögerung statt. Das 
ist überraschend, weil sich mit der Verzögerung die Konfliktsituation bestenfalls für 
einen der beiden Kontrahenten verbessern kann. Derjenige, dessen Position im Konflikt 
sich verschlechtert, sollte eigentlich auf eine schnelle Konfliktlösung drängen. Carl von 
Clausewitz erklärte die mögliche Verzögerung aus der Vorteilhaftigkeit der Defensive: 
wer eine schnelle Konfliktlösung erzwingen will, muss in die Offensive. Wir bestätigen 
diese Einsicht von Clausewitz in einer formalen Analyse. Die Analyse ergibt ferner, 
dass auch ein schwacher Gegner zum Angreifer werden kann, wenn sich seine Position 
im Zeitablauf erheblich verschlechtert, und zeigt, dass zukünftige Kosten der 
Konfliktvorbereitung eher eine frühe Konfliktlösung begünstigen. 
                                                 
*
  We thank two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.  
1 Introduction
In conßict situations the showdown is often delayed, even if it seems clear
that the showdown cannot be avoided. In movies and in writings delay of the
showdown is a common pattern. This reßects similar patterns of conßict in
the real world, in the area of military conßict and other conßictual situations.
Suppose there are two contestants, A and B. The contestants know their
current relative strengths and anticipate their expected future strengths,
where strength can be seen as a broad measure of conßict resources, in-
telligence about the rivals resources etc. If both agents are fully informed
about the status quo and all future changes of the status quo are determin-
istic and fully known to the agents, the situation cannot improve for both of
them. This is what generates a puzzle: As Carl von Clausewitz (1832/1976,
p.84) puts it: If it is in As interest not to attack B now but to attack him
in four weeks, then it is in Bs interest not to be attacked in four weeks time,
but now.
Clausewitz also oﬀers a solution. He needs two basic insights for his
conclusions: Þrst, each contestant can force the showdown, but only as an
attacker. No doubt, the showdown between A and B takes place if one party,
say A, starts it, and B has no reasonable1 option other than to Þght. Second,
there is an asymmetry between attack and defense, and it is advantageous to
take the role of defense. Based on his knowledge of military history and on
his personal experience as a military leader Clausewitz argues that the claim
often made that the attacker has the advantage is wrong in most situations.2
In line with Clausewitz insights is a more recent example for conven-
tional war. Drawing on battle experience from the Second World War, many
experts claim that a 3-fold superiority in resources is typically needed for
a successful conventional battle attack (see Kielmansegg 1977, pp.310-312).
The claim has been made that such a rule holds more generally for a broader
class of conßicts. Henry Kissinger (1960, p.809) claims that conventional
1B could declare itself defeated, in which case it has also lost the war.
2Clausewitz (1832/1976, p.84) writes: I am convinced that the superiority of defensive
(if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than it appears at Þrst sight.
1
warfare favors the defense, and reports that even in World War II, the
attacker generally required a superiority of three to one. The U.S. Minister
of Defense James R. Schlesinger (1975, III-15) suggested a ratio of three to
two. For further discussions see Kahn (1969, p.98n.), Canby (1975, p.12n.)
and Stratmann (1981, p.52n.).
These assessments can be taken as evidence that there are at least some in-
stances in which there is an advantage of defense, making it useful to analyse
this case.3 The fact that it takes only one party to start a contest together
with an advantage of defense lead Clausewitz to the following resolution:
Consequently, if the side favored by present conditions is not suﬃ-
ciently strong to do without the added advantages of the defense,
it will have to accept the prospect of acting under unfavorable
conditions in the future. To Þght a defensive battle under these
less favorable conditions may still be better than to attack imme-
diately or to make peace. (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p.84)
Delay is an important empirical phenomenon also in other areas of eco-
nomics and has been analyzed in various contexts. Uncertainty, revelation
of information in the future, or asymmetric information is vital in most of
these examples.4 A type of one-sided delay that occurs in a full information
3In some other instances there might be an advantage of the attacker. This inverse
asymmetry does not bring about delay: if there is an advantage of attack, the one who
loses from delay can always attack and induce the showdown immediately.
4Waiting games are an example, particularly in the context of private provision of public
goods if there is uncertainty about other contributors types (Bliss and Nalebuﬀ, 1984;
Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ, 1985; Gradstein, 1992). Here all agents bear the cost of waiting,
trying to shift the burden of contribution to others. Delay in situations when action reveals
information that is also useful for others is related to this (e.g., Chamley and Gale, 1994;
Gale, 1996; and Thimann and Thum, 1998). Delay has also been observed in bargaining
games, for various reasons (Admati and Perry, 1987; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1995a, 1995b;
Sakovics, 1993). Schweizer (1989) and Spier (1994) consider pretrial bargaining and the
choice between settling their dispute out of court and resorting to costly litigation. Further,
in a situation in which superior information may arrive later, an agent may delay an
irreversible investment choice in order to preserve an option value (McDonald and Siegel,
1986; and Pindyck, 1991, for an overview).
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framework is analyzed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), explaining how se-
quential choice and Stackelberg leadership can evolve endogenously, and in
the context of strategic trade, by Syropoulos (1994).
In the conßict we consider here, all agents are perfectly and completely
informed and all agents delay. The stronger agent waits to become even
stronger before trying to beat the weaker agent. The weaker agent does not
like this, but the only way to accelerate the outcome is to assume a some-
what less advantageous role as attacker. While our analysis lends support
to Clausewitzs claim, it also adds to his insights. First, it reveals that the
size of the expected change in relative strength is crucial for whether there
is delay. Delay does not occur if the change in relative strength is very large.
A strong contestant may want to delay the showdown if his relative strength
is further increasing in the future, but the contestant who is weaker than his
competitor may force an early showdown if his relative strength is expected
to deteriorate by a suﬃciently large amount. Second, we consider the cost of
future strength. Future military strength goes along with additional invest-
ment and, hence, additional cost. This additional cost of delay is neglected in
Clausewitzs reasoning. It is an important force towards an early resolution
of conßict. The cost is also interesting from a welfare point of view. Own
cost of investment in future military strength is internalized in the decision
to delay, the cost of the competitor is not.
2 A formal approach
Suppose there are two rulers A and B, each of which rules a Þefdom. The
Þefdom represents a value to whomever rules it. For instance, this value
could be the present value of future tax revenue that can be extracted. For
simplicity, this revenue is some exogenously given amount T and the same
in both Þefdoms.
There is conßict between the two rulers: before they arrive at the period
in which these revenues accrue, they can try and defeat the other ruler,
in which case the winner receives the incomes of both Þefdoms, and the
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loser receives zero. The interval in which war can take place consists of
two periods. We call these periods t = 0 (early) and t = 1 (late). The
rulers decide simultaneously in period 0 whether or not to attack. If at least
one ruler decides to attack, a battle contest takes place in which one of the
contestants is killed or Þnally defeated. If no attack takes place in period 0,
then the rulers decide simultaneously in period 1 whether or not to attack.
A contest in this period also leads to a Þnal defeat of one of the contestants.
Accordingly, the showdown takes place at 0, or at 1, or not at all, but not at
both times.
The technology that determines the outcomes of military conßict is as
follows. We distinguish between a situation in which both rulers decide to
attack, and a situation in which only one ruler decides to attack, making
the other ruler a defender. We will concentrate on the latter case, because
in any pure strategy equilibrium at most one of the rulers will attack, and
the description of what happens with simultaneous attack is needed only to
make some out-of-equilibrium outcomes well deÞned. If both rulers decide to
attack in the same period, a coin if tossed and determines who has the role
of the attacker and who becomes the defender.
To describe the actual contest which may take place at 0 or at 1, we draw
on the contest literature. Let ruler a be the attacker, and d the defender,
and let xa ≥ 0 and xd ≥ 0 be the resources they spend in the contest. Then
the attacker wins in the contest with a probability equal to p(xa ,xd ) and the
defender wins with the remaining probability 1− p(xa , xd ). We assume that
there is an advantage of defense. That is, given the conßict resources xA and
xB of contestants A and B, the contestant in the position of the attacker has
a lower probability of winning than if he became the defender, i.e.,
p(xA,xB ) < 1− p(xB ,xA ). ( 1)
Further, the contest success function p is strictly increasing in its Þrst and
strictly decreasing in its second argument.
Let mA and mB be the rulers conßict resources available in period 0,
and let them be given exogenously and known by both rulers. It simpliÞes
the analysis if we assume that conßict resources have no other use than in
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the contest, and hence, if there is a conßict, the contestants use all military
resources they have5 if one of them (or both) decide to attack at 0. In this
case the military contest takes place and determines who wins and who loses.
As the loser loses everything, there is no conßict at 1 and the winner receives
the future returns on both territories, 2T .
If no attack occurred at 0, the stock of military resources may change.
Let nA and nB be the resources available in period 1. These are exogenous
for most part of the analysis and also known to both rulers at the beginning
of period 0. Making these resources available may involve some costs, which
are incurred only if conßict does not take place in period 0 already. We
denote these costs by cA(nA) ≥ 0 and cB(nB) ≥ 0, respectively.
The resources available for the military conßict develop in similar or oppo-
site directions for A and B. Think of Hannibal trying to conquer the Roman
Empire. As time moved on, Hannibals army was weakened. He lost a major
share of his war elephants, for instance. At the same time the Roman Empire
could collect and redirect more resources into military uses. Similarly, a city
which is under siege, may weaken while the attacker can collect and mobilize
more troups from its own hinterland and increase the stock and the eﬃciency
of his weapons, or the city may wait to receive support from allies, while the
attacking army may suﬀer from disease and have used up all resources that
can be gained from plundering the neighborhood.
Summarizing, the timing of actions and events is as follows. The values of
mA, mB, nA and nB are known to both rulers at the beginnig of period 0 and
exogenous. Each contestant decides whether to attack in period 0. If at least
one attacks in period 0, the contest takes place, the winner is determined and
the game ends. If none of them attacks, then nA and nB are generated at
5In a more general framework, part of the unused military resources could be converted
back to consumer goods and be part of the payoﬀ of the contest winner. However, while
this introduces another interesting dimension, it generates a distinction between interior
and corner solutions that distracts from the issue of delay which we concentrate on. Also,
for a large parameter set in which T is suﬃciently large compared to mA and mB, the
contestants are budget constrained and use all resourcesmA andmB in the conßict anyway
even if unused resources could be used for consumption.
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the beginning of period 1 and the costs are cA(nA) and cB(nB), respectively.
Then the rulers decide whether to attack in period 1.
Suﬃcient conditions for a delayed conßict are as follows.
Proposition 1 Let nA ≥ nB be exogenously given. Suﬃcient conditions for
a delayed conßict are
p(nA ,nB ) > 1/2 (2)
p(nA ,nB )− p(m A ,mB ) > cA (n A )
2T 
(3)
and
1− p(nA ,nB )− p(mB ,mA ) > cB (nB )
2T
. (4)
Proof: Let (2) be satisÞed. Then A attacks in period 1 (if no contest
has occurred in period 0.) Given that the conßict will occur in period 1, A
prefers delay in period 0 if
2Tp(mA ,mB ) < 2Tp(n A ,nB )− cA (nA )
and B prefers not to attack in period 0 if
2Tp(mB ,mA ) < 2T (1− p(nA ,nB ))− cB (nB ).
These conditions are equivalent to (3) and (4). Thus if (2) - (4) hold, there
is an equilibrium with delayed conßict. ¤
Note that (3) and (4) can be fulÞlled simultaneously even for cA(nA) > 0
and cB(nB) > 0 if there is an advantage of defense as described by (1),
because this condition states that p(mA ,mB ) + p(mB ,mA ) < 1.
Condition (2) makes sure that A attacks B in period 1 if no attack took
place in period 0. For cA(x) = cB(x) = 0 condition (3) states that As win
probability as an attacker in period 1 is higher than his win probability as an
attacker in period 0, explaining why A prefers delay. If the cost in period 1
is positive, the increase in win probability in period 1 must compensate ruler
A also for the cost of his additional investment in future military strength.
Condition (4) states that B is better oﬀ by waiting and becoming a de-
fender in period 1 than by attacking in period 0. This condition makes
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the intuition of Clausewitz more precise. Even though Bs conditions may
worsen, B could be willing to accept a delay, because the only way to avoid a
delay is to switch from the role of a defender to the role of an attacker, hence
assuming the burden of attack. Also it reveals that evan a contestant who
is weaker than his rival in period 0 may attack in period 0 if this contestant
becomes even much weaker in period 1. We will illustrate this in an example
below.
Conditions (3) and (4) also show that the costs of building up military
power in period 1 further tighten the conditions for which delay occurs. This
aspect is absent in Clausewitzs analysis. Delay causes an additional cost,
and the contestants must be compensated for these additional cost in order
to be willing to delay.
We can also consider welfare. In the absence of discounting and with
an exogenous and symmetric valuation of winning the contest, delay reduces
welfare by the cost c(nA) + c(nB).
It is also interesting to discuss an endogenous choice of nA and nB between
periods 0 and 1. In this case each contestant will consider the expected cost
of continued conßict in the continuation equilibrium if no contest took place
in period 0. This may but need not alter the outcome. For instance, let
cA (n A ) = 0 for n A ≤ n∗A , cA(nA) = ∞ for nA > n∗A, and cB(nB) = 0 for
nB ≤ n∗B , and cB (nB ) = ∞ for nB > ∞, for some given n∗A and n∗B , with
p(n∗A ,n∗B ) > 1/2. If no contest took place in period 0, both contestants will
choose these thresholds n∗A and n
∗
B in the continuation equilibrium, A will
attack in period 1. The equilibrium of the game with an endogenous choice
of nA and nB is identical to the equilibrium of a game in which n∗A and n
∗
B
are exogenously given.
The equilibrium outcome may diﬀer if a large share of the total rents 2T is
dissipated in period 1 if no contest took place in period 0, as this will induce
the contestants to favor an early resolution of the conßict. Both contestants
may want an early contest, but each may prefer the other contestant to
attack. This can lead to a mixed strategy equilibrium in period 0 in which
each contestant randomizes and chooses to attack in period 0 with some
positive probability. Even in such mixed strategy equilibria delay occurs
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with a positive probability, but for a diﬀerent reason than in the cases that
are described by Proposition 1.
3 A parametric example
To illustrate how the equilibrium outcome depends on the asymmetry be-
tween attack and defense, we consider the following example. Suppose that
p(xa ,xd ) =
(
xa
xa+kxd
if max{xa , xd } > 0
1/2 if x a = xd = 0
(5)
and the defender wins with the remaining probability 1 − p. This contest
success probability is the same whether the attack occurs early or late. Here,
k ≥ 1 measures the defenders advantage: resources spent in defending are
more eﬀective in the contest than resources spent in attacking. To achieve
the same win probability as a defender, an attacker must spend k times the
eﬀort of the defender.6 For the case in which both rulers decide to attack,
we continue to assume that the roles of attack and defense are assigned by
the ßip of a coin. If neither decides to attack at 0 or at 1, no contest takes
place. Both rulers stay in power in this case and consume the incomes from
their Þefdoms.
For simplicity we consider the case in which mA, mB, nA and nB are
exogenous and cA(nA) = cB(nB) = 0.
Suppose no attack took place at 0, and resources in 1 are nA and nB. In
this case the contestants are involved in the following game:
attack not attack
attack 2k ( nA )
2 +(1 +k 2 )nA nB
2(nA +knB )( knA +nB ) 
2T ,  2k (nB )
2 +(1 +k 2 )nA nB
2( nA +knB )(knA +nB ) 
2T nA
nA+knB
2T , knB
nA+knB
2T
not attack knA
knA+nB
2T , nB
knA+nB
2T T ,  T
Accordingly, if nA > knB , A attacks and B does not attack, resulting in
payoﬀs GA = nAnA+knB 2T and GB =
knB
nA+knB
2T . If nB > knA, B attacks and
6This contest success function may look ad hoc at Þrst sight. It is frequently used in
various contexts, however. Skaperdas (1996) axiomatized the symmetric version (k = 1),
and various micro-foundations that are related to innovation processes can be found in
Mortensen (1982), Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), Baye and Hoppe (2001).
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A does not attack, resulting in payoﬀs GA = knAknA+nB 2T and GB =
nB
knA+nB
2T .
Finally, if nA < knB and nB < knA, then no conßict occurs because neither
party attacks. The reason is that the peaceful payoﬀ even to the rival with
the larger military resources is higher in the peaceful outcome than if this
contestant assumes the role of attack.
Consider now stage one of the game: the decision whether to attack or not
at time 0. Suppose the rivals both know how their own and their competitors
eﬀective military resources develop. Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 (i) If mB
k
< mA < kmB and nBk < nA < knB then no conßict
occurs. (ii) If mi > kmj or ni > knj, then conßict occurs. (iii) Conßict is
delayed to period 1 (even if mi > kmj) if k2njmi −mjni > 0, ni > knj and
ni
mi
>
nj
mj
.
Part (i) has a simple intuition. The condition nB
k
< nA < knB makes sure
that it is disadvantageous for each ruler to attack at time 1 relative to no
conßict. Knowing that there is no conßict at time 1, each of them prefers not
to attack in period 0. Consider part (ii). If ni > knj, and if there has been
no conßict at 0, then i will attack at time 1. mi > kmj is also suﬃcient for
conßict. Given this condition, conßict at 0 yields a higher outcome to i than
T , the payoﬀ which i receives if there is no conßict in each period. Hence,
i need not attack at 0, but only if i plans to attack at time 1. Consider
the three conditions determining delay in (iii). For delay it must hold that
conßict is proÞtable for the attacker at time 1, which is the case for i by
condition ni > knj. Second, it must hold that, anticipating is attack at
time 1, neither i nor j want to attack at time 0. Condition ni
mi
>
nj
mj
makes
sure that i gains from delay. However, if i gains from delay, this implies that
j loses from the fact that i delays the conßict from time 0 to time 1. The
alternative for j is to attack at time 0. However, mj
mj+kmi
<
knj
knj+ni
makes
sure that j prefers to be attacked at time 1 rather than being the attacker
at time 0, and this condition reduces to k2njmi −mjni > 0. This concludes
the proof. ¤
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mB/2 mB 2mB
nA
nB/2
nB
2nB
nA = mA
nA = 4mA
nA =    mA
1
4
mA
Region DA
Region DB
Figure 1: Equilibrium with and without delay
Figure 1 further illustrates the conditions in Proposition 1 for the case
with mB = nB and k = 2 that is, if only As resources change. Let Ω ≡
{(mA ,nA ) | mA ≥ 0,nA ≥ 0}. Conßict occurs everywhere outside the set P ≡
{(mA ,nA ) ¯¯(mA ,nA ) ∈ [ mB2 , 2mB]× [nB2 , 2nB]}. In all regions except Ω \ P
a contest takes place in one of the periods. The contest is delayed to 1 in
the regions DA and DB. In region DA the ruler A delays his attack on B to
period 1, even if mA > 2mB. In region DB ruler B delays his attack on ruler
A to period 1.
In all other regions Ω\ (P ∪DA∪DB) the contest takes place in period 0.
In some of these cases one ruler, say B, attacks the other ruler A in period
0 even though ruler B is less then twice as strong as A in that period (or A
even stronger than B), because ruler B anticipates a very big increase in As
strength.
The comparative statics of delay can be analysed using Figure 1. An
increase in k enlarges the region in which no contest at all takes place. This
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also shifts the lower boundary of region DA upwards, and the upper bound-
ary of region DB downwards. However, the increase in k also shifts the
constraint that limits region DA on the left hand side further to the left, and
the constraint that limits region DB from the right hand side further to the
right.
Figure 1 reveals that the asymmetry between attack and defense is crucial
for delay as an equilibrium outcome. If the variable k that measures the
eﬃciency advantage in defense approaches unity, both the regions in which no
conßict occurs and the regions in which attack is delayed disappear. For k = 1
conßict cannot be avoided and the ruler whose relative strength deteriorates
between 0 and 1 attacks immediately.
4 Conclusions
This note reconsiders Clausewitz conjecture about delay in conßict as an
equilibrium outcome even under perfect information. If an attacker has a
disadvantage in a conßict between two agents, both agents may want to de-
lay the conßict; one agent gains from delaying his attack, the other agent
loses from this delay, but prefers delay to assuming the role of an attacker.
However, even the weaker agent may force an early showdown if this agents
strength weakens by too much. Delay is more likely to occur if the oppor-
tunity cost of future military resources is low, if the advantage of defense is
large, and if the conditions for the contestant who is the weaker contestant in
period 1 have deteriorated from period 0 to period 1, but not by too much.
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